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Abstract 
Complexity and integration are longstanding widely debated issues in philosophy of science and 
recent contributions have largely focused on biology and biomedicine. This paper specifically 
considers some methodological novelties in cancer research, motivated by various features of 
tumours as complex diseases, and shows how they encourage some rethinking of philosophical 
discourses on those topics. In particular, we discuss the integrative cluster approach, and 
analyse its potential in the epistemology of cancer. We suggest that, far from being the solution 
to tame cancer complexity, this approach offers a philosophically interesting new manner of 
considering 
integration, and show how it can help addressing the apparent contrast between a pluralistic and 
a unitary account. 
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1. Introduction: philosophical issues in past and present cancer research  
In 2014, R.A. Weinberg, one of the world’s leading molecular oncologists, published a paper to 
celebrate 40 years of Cell, the prestigious journal that “publishes findings of unusual 
significance in any area of experimental biology”. Weinberg’s paper, titled ‘Coming full circle. 
From endless complexity to simplicity and back again’, is a synthetic but illuminating history of 
cancer research over the last 40 years. That research started from the “phenomenological chaos 
that the traditional cancer researchers had been accumulating from more than half a century”, 
and moved to a molecular level with a reductionist approach based on the presupposition that 
finding out “simple molecular mechanisms” (p. 267) would suffice to win what, in 1971, former 
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US President R. Nixon called the War on Cancer1.  Since then, journals devoted to cancer 
research have published an increasingly large number of articles dealing with such molecular 
mechanisms, which also undoubtedly spurred many philosophers to investigate their nature and 
role. 
Together with most scholars in the field, Weinberg claimed that the reductionist approach 
resulted in remarkable steps forward in our knowledge of the details of what happens locally in 
certain cell compartments or in certain infracellular signalling lines. Notwithstanding its 
oversimplifications, the approach led to significant progress concerning the role of certain 
viruses in cancerogenesis, the function of oncogenes and oncosuppressors, the impact of 
genome and epigenome mutations, and many others. Unfortunately, however, the huge efforts of 
small and large laboratories over the world did not lead to victory in the cancer war, nor did they 
reach global knowledge of what cancer is, how it develops and how it can be defeated. 
It is also worth recalling that a silent change occurred in the main cancer research centres 
about 15 years ago: the number of bioinformaticians drastically increased, especially because 
the new sequencing biotechnologies started producing enormous quantities of data at an 
unprecedented pace, with the immediate need to govern them and understand their meaning2. 
Further major changes gradually took place. New biotechnologies and the ‘omics’ involved 
opened the road to an acknowledgement that cancerogenesis and metastatic processes were not 
easily understandable and that a purely reductionist approach, despite all its positive aspects, 
could not lead to a genuine comprehension of their nature and behaviour. Greater awareness of 
the limits and gaps in scientific knowledge on the topic had a major impact on attitudes and 
expectations concerning treatments and their efficacy. It was soon realized that cancer is an 
extremely spatially, temporally and hierarchically complex disease, and that a new approach 
was needed: an approach that could not disregard the enormous databases made available by the 
deluge of data produced by laboratories.  
Analysing this scenario, Weinberg’s paper reaches a conclusion that, although rather 
worrying, is extremely interesting for the purpose of reflecting on complexity and its 
interpretation in cancer studies. Weinberg clearly stated: “We lack the conceptual paradigms 
and computational strategies for dealing with this complexity. And equally painful, we don’t 
know how to integrate individual data sets, such as those deriving from cancer genome analyses, 
with other, equally important data sets, such as proteomics. This is most frustrating, since it is 
becoming increasingly apparent that a precise and truly useful understanding of the behaviour of 
                                                             
1
 See: https://www.cancer.gov/about-nci/legislative/history/national-cancer-act-1971. 
2
 On the rise, growth and success of bioinformatics, especially with respect to the life sciences, see e.g. Perez-
Iratxeta, Andrade-Navarro and Wren (2007); Ouzounis (2012); Mehmood, Sehar and Ahmad (2014); Ratti (2016). 
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individual cancer cells and the tumours that they form will only come once we are able to 
integrate and then distil these data. So, perhaps ironically, we have come full circle, beginning 
in a period when vast amounts of cancer research data yielded little insight into underlying 
mechanisms to a period (1980–2000) when a flurry of molecular and genetic research gave hope 
that cancer really could be understood through simple and logical reductionist thinking, and 
finally to our current dilemma. Once again, we can’t really assimilate and interpret most of the 
data that we accumulate. How will all this play out?” (p. 271). That is the serious question raised 
by many biomedical researchers and highly relevant to grasp how understanding cancer has 
been evolving. In turn, changes in the understanding the natural history of cancer, especially due 
to increasing awareness of its heterogeneity in space and in time, affect the design of further 
studies and the assessment of the impact of different kinds of interventions. These issues are 
also highly relevant for philosophers of science and prompt some rethinking of a few crucial 
notions, as we will show. 
 Weinberg points out that both conceptual paradigms and computational strategies are 
needed. As philosophers, we are clearly concerned with the ways in which the former affects the 
latter, and vice versa. How the design of computational strategies depends on the underlying 
conceptual paradigms regarding the phenomenon under examination, and how the results can be 
evaluated as more or less adequate according to the paradigm assumed, are very important 
matters. Equally important is the analysis of how conceptual paradigms can be framed, in turn, 
by the computational strategies available. A second set of problems hinted at in Weinberg’s 
quotation has to do with the integration of data sets: What exactly is to be integrated, and what 
does integration require in order to be successfully performed? On which background picture of 
cancer does integration build upon, and what does it achieve? Thirdly, once we realize that 
currently we “can’t really assimilate and interpret most of the data that we accumulate”, we are 
urged to rethink our conception of what “a precise and truly useful understanding” of the 
behaviour of tumours should be like, and what role integration might play in that respect. What 
integration exactly amounts to, how it can de facto be performed, and its impact on a “truly 
useful understanding” to be reached for specific epistemic purposes (in particular, classification, 
prediction, intervention) are issues which need to be explored in depth.  
All these questions stem from the recent history of cancer studies and have both a specific 
and a more general scope. On the one hand, they call for answers directly dealing with the 
pressing issues at stake – i.e. cancerogenesis and metastatic processes – given their possible 
implications for both future research lines and clinical approaches. On the other hand, they are 
of wider philosophical interest, insofar as they can encourage further reflections on integration 
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and complexity, both within philosophy of medicine with respect to other complex diseases (e.g. 
diabetes and psychiatric disorders3) and with respect to complex phenomena as addressed by 
other disciplinary fields. The conceptual understanding of integration, and of modes of data 
integration, has a direct impact on epistemological practices and outcomes, as causal 
explanations of disease and prediction of its evolving in time.   
To tackle these epistemological concerns, we should not be as pessimistic as Weinberg seems 
to be. In the oncological field a number of papers have been appearing in biomedical journals 
proposing new ideas on integration – exactly as Weinberg suggested – to govern, even 
etiologically and prognostically, the complexity of cancer pathologies. These new perspectives 
focus on a different kind of integration and present us with a clutch of problems that we should 
be ready and conceptually equipped to discuss also in philosophical terms. We believe that 
novel approaches to integration in biomedicine, the meaning attributed to it and the uses to 
which integrative accounts are put in that context offer interesting challenges to philosophical 
reflections on the topic.       
This paper addresses some of these pressing philosophical questions arising, as indicated, at 
the frontiers of biomedical research. In order to entertain a genuine and fruitful dialogue with 
scientists, a proper understanding of what is going on in science is needed. Only on this ground 
will philosophical work be able to grasp critical features of biomedical research and contribute 
to their theoretical disentanglement. It is in this spirit that what follows provides a short 
overview of the philosophical debate on integration as a means of addressing complexity (§ 2), 
followed by a sketchy outline of the state-of-the-art of research into tumour heterogeneity, 
biomarkers and stratification: all issues directly affecting our understanding of cancer and its 
epistemologically problematic features (§ 3). We then present a particular solution, the 
integrative-cluster approach, and analyse its potential in the epistemology of cancer (§ 4). In no 
way do we claim that this is the solution to tame cancer complexity, rather that this is one 
possible and interesting way to tame cancer complexity. Moreover, it is a solution that offers the 
opportunity to propose, also from a philosophical perspective, a new manner of considering 
integration and the apparent contrast between a pluralistic and a unitary account. This will be the 
specific scientific terrain on which our analysis will focus in the last section (§ 5). Certainly, 
complexity and integration have already been dealt with extensively in the philosophical 
literature4, but the rapidly evolving situation in biomedical research and related methodologies 
demands renewed reflections on what exactly they amount to.  More specifically, we will show 
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 See e.g. Lemoine 2017. 
4
 See e.g. Mitchell (2003; 2009); Bechtel and Richardson (2010); Hooker (2011); Ladyman, Lambert, Wiesner 
(2013); Ladyman and Wiesner (forthcoming, 2018).  
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that the integration offered via the integrative-cluster approach allows us to see the notion of 
integration itself in a different way. In particular, we will argue that it allows for a unitary 
framework to address complex diseases, which considers both causal explanatory and predictive 
aspects. This kind of integration might therefore allow us to grasp the etiological and prognostic 
features of cancer, in a unitary and – obviously – probabilistic scenario.   
 
2. On complexity and integration  
There has been much talk about complexity and complex systems in philosophy and it is not 
possible to extensively review here all the positions. To pave the way for our analysis, we recall 
just some core claims allowing a better grasp of integration from an epistemological standpoint.  
Although the literature provides no unanimous definition of complexity, accounts of what are 
deemed “complex systems” converge on a few aspects. Complex systems are constituted by a 
multiplicity of parts, belonging to several different levels and mutually interacting. Their 
relations are non-linear, and usually their behaviour is highly sensitive to initial conditions and 
emerges from the interactions among the parts by virtue of some self-organizing and 
hierarchical arrangement. Such behaviour does not just result from the aggregated behaviour of 
the parts involved, which cannot be inter-substituted: specific structural and functional 
organization of the system is crucial to its working, and established across what are deemed 
multiple levels (see e.g. Craver 2007, p. 135; Wimsatt 2007, pp. 280-281). Attempts to 
understand the complexity of natural phenomena have hence been accompanied by a rejection 
of divide-and-conquer strategies aiming to grasp phenomena by pursuing decompositions, 
studying parts of systems in isolation and neglecting contextual elements. The parts of a 
complex system are inter-dependent, and their behaviour is “co-determined by the system’s 
organization” (Kaiser 2013, p. 260), and dependent on certain variations of contextual factors.  
 While a range of different perspectives and taxonomies of complexity is currently available 
(Wimsatt 2007, ch. 9; Mitchell 2009; Ladyman, Lambert and Wiesner 2013), it is a shared view 
that no single epistemic strategy will suffice to grasp it. Given multilevel structures, the 
heterogeneity of component parts, and high variability of complex systems, it seems that no 
unitary explanatory or predictive theory or model could be applied, in particular that there are no 
“simple, universal, and timeless underling laws to explain what there is and how it behaves” 
(Mitchell 2009, p. 11). A multiplicity of modelling practices and explanatory perspectives seem 
therefore to be needed to address complex systems, and “integration” is often advocated. 
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 Unfortunately, consensus does not hold on the notion of integration either: there is neither a 
unique definition nor a unique form of integration, with philosophers of science proposing 
various versions, labelling them differently5. 
 Different forms of integration have been discussed together with their different 
epistemological implications. It has been stressed that they can encourage, for instance, 
interactions between different disciplinary fields and cooperation between different lines of 
investigations and research communities. Moreover, integration can demand the combination of 
different accounts of the same phenomenon as studied within a single field, but analysed along 
different descriptive levels or investigated for different epistemic purposes: each account or 
level of analysis will claim to have some, but not all, relevant information for the construction of 
an account of the phenomenon at stake. Complexity dictates the pursuit of interactions on 
different problem domains and problem agendas, and draws upon a variety of tools to foster 
discussions on the criteria for model adequacy. Integration is usually presented as beneficial in 
the literature. It should be noted that it is not at odds with unification, but does not coincide with 
it: unificatory trends search actively for some comprehensive picture, while integration is mostly 
driven by a problem-oriented approach. 
First and foremost, discourses on complexity are meant to stress the multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of variables involved in the representation of a single phenomenon or set of 
phenomena, the multiplicity of inter-related levels which are structurally and functionally 
organized, and the mutual constraints of the system’s behaviour due to component parts and 
vice versa. Accordingly, reflections on complexity and integration have been debated as, 
amongst others, an “antidote” to reductionism: given the complexity of most biological 
phenomena, there is no single lowest-level theory from which multilevel knowledge from 
several different fields can be derived. As mentioned, a plurality of incompletely articulated, 
partly complementary and partly contradictory views are asked to interact. Such theoretical 
interactions will have to take place at different scales of components and across different spatial 
and temporal locations.  
In what respects are such reflections on complexity relevant for cancer research and for the 
attempts to tame its heterogeneity in space and time, in order to propose therapeutic responses 
and predict patient outcomes? In §1 we stressed how, high expectations notwithstanding, the 
reductionist approach per se has not proved up to the job to master cancer’s complexity. In §3 
we will further show how cancer research must deal with: i) highly heterogeneous variables, 
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 On integration in biology, along a few of the different dimensions we have recalled, see, e.g., Leonelli (2008) and 
(2016) ch. 6; Brigandt (2010; 2013); O’Malley and Soyer (2012); VV. AA. (2013). On the possible benefits of 
different ways of conceiving integration, and possible epistemic trade-offs, see also Chang (2012), ch. 5, and 
Plutynski (2013). 
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acting at different biological levels and at different spatial and temporal scales, and whose 
organizational principles are still largely opaque; ii) huge amounts of available data; iii) the risk 
of fragmentation of classificatory practices and research lines. These issues undoubtedly impact 
on our prospects for an adequate causal explanation and successful prediction of its 
development. It should be stressed that it is not only an epistemological concern that should 
drive reflections on complexity in this context. Cancer complexity should first and foremost be 
tackled for both research and clinical purposes6. Rather than an exclusive focus on, for instance, 
some fine-grained understanding of possible different “shades of complexity”, solutions must be 
envisaged to classify and treat cancer as effectively as possible, and integration plays an 
essential role in this respect. 
As already mentioned above, complexity and the issue of integration have been largely 
addressed together with forms of pluralism and the need to have a range of multiple approaches, 
views, methods, standards, ...  In the philosophical debate, pluralism has been mostly evaluated 
positively as bringing epistemic extra-value to the construction of scientific knowledge. 
Although a plurality of theoretical and/or clinical approaches is doubtless highly beneficial, and 
the importance, plausibility and usefulness of pluralistic attitudes cannot be neglected in the 
biomedical framework either, reaching integration in some unitary framework can have the 
merit of making complexity epistemically more tractable for the benefit of patients. 
Undoubtedly, if we have a unitary framework of the disease, in our case cancer, and if this 
unitary framework is tailored to a molecularly specific group of individuals, we may propose i) 
a more homogeneous treatment to any patient having that particular molecular characterisation, 
as precision medicine is indeed now attempting to do; ii) a first explanatory account of his/her 
disease; and iii) a prediction of its outcome.  
What follows does not aim to suggest revisions or refinements to any extant philosophical 
taxonomy, but to analyse what scientific practice in cancer studies takes as the most pressing 
challenges, what strategies are being de facto devised to tackle them, and what epistemological 
implications can be drawn. The notion of integration we will discuss builds on computational 
tools as key resources to name clinically meaningful clusters: it is through the identification and 
clustering of sets of common (molecular, epidemiological, clinical, ...) features – rather than on 
some combination of a range of different, partial models, or on the search for underlying 
mechanisms – that cancer subtypes are identified and data integrated in single accounts. Each 
account is molecularly characterised and clinically tailored, and each one offers a unitary 
framework, with both explanatory and predictive significance. In this way, the individual patient 
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 On pathways to the clinic, see also Fagan (2017). 
 8 
with his/her particular molecular and non-molecular profile (i.e., for example, his/her clinical 
profile or his/her lifestyle) can be both treated in the most accurate adequate manner (of course 
relatively to the coeval best clinical knowledge) and informed at least of the molecular causes of 
his/her pathology and of his/her possible future, by being inserted in the appropriate cluster. In 
other words, in integrative clustering each clusterisation is put forward as a tool to tackle 
biomedical complexity, as such able on its own to do so with no need to be complemented 
by/combined with other clusterisations. Far from having just theoretical import, integrative 
clustering promises to have an active impact on clinical treatments adopted for the single patient 
and, more in general, on the strategies and guidelines at population level. It is in these respects 
that the debate on understanding cancer complexity has become strictly interwoven with that 
concerning so-called precision medicine, as we will show below. This innovative scientific 
perspective also challenges philosophy of science, in particular approaches to integration and 
uses to which notions of integration are put, and affects modes of conceiving the natural history 
of cancer, as we will illustrate.          
3. The state-of-the-art: cancer as a complex disease 
Over the last few years, there has been much talk about ‘precision medicine’ and ‘personalized 
medicine’. These locutions have been used to refer to different research strategies and 
communities, but all connected to the progress of molecular medicine, and related clinical 
expectations (See Boniolo and Nathan, 2017). The document of the Precision Medicine 
Initiative, launched in 2015 by former US President, Barack Obama,7 states that precision 
medicine is an “innovative approach that takes into account individual differences in people’s 
genes, environments, and lifestyles”, and that it is about “delivering the right treatments, at the 
right time, every time to the right person”, as Obama himself emphasized in an interview 
(Kaiser, 2015). Without much surprise, these words and concepts are more or less the same as 
those we find in the definiens of ‘personalized medicine’ in the position paper of European 
Society for Predictive, Preventive and Personalised Medicine.8 Over and above different 
definitions of ‘precision medicine’ and ‘personalized medicine’, hereafter we accept the US 
National Research Council’s suggestion to use ‘precision medicine’ especially when research is 
at issue. Of the different available interpretations of personalised medicine, we here take the 
term ‘personalized’ to imply that treatments and preventions are being advanced specifically for 
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 See, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/precision-medicine (Accessed 30 April 2017). On this initiative, see, 
for example, Ashley (2015); Collins and Varmus (2015); Kohane, I.S. (2015); Sabatello and Appelbaum (2017). 
For a first hint on a philosophical analysis, see Tonelli and Shirts (2017). 
8 See the position paper of European Society for Predictive, Preventive and Personalised Medicine (EPMA) by 
Golubnitschaja et al. (2016). 
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a given individual9. Precision medicine is hence preferred as it focuses on identifying which 
approaches will be effective for which groups of patients on the basis of genetic, environmental, 
and lifestyle factors.10 But what motivates such an approach from an oncological standpoint and 
what are the epistemological challenges it must face?  
 
3.1. The quest for integration 
Even a quick look at the huge amount of scientific, didactic and popular papers on precision 
medicine clearly reveals that it owes much to and is supported by the amazing advances of 
computational and information technologies (CIT) and biotechnologies over the last few years. 
Two biotechnology fields in particular, the new sequencing technologies and the new imaging 
technologies, have seen this major impact and have provided a decisive boost to precision 
medicine. Fig. 1 shows the state-of-the-art of sequencing technologies, and how the data 
analysis permitted by CIT and the integration of outcomes have become central points for 
research and clinics.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1 (From Shyr and Liu, 2013). WGS = Whole Genome Sequencing; WES = Whole-Exome Sequencing; RNA-
Seq = RNA Sequencing; Bisulfite-Seq = Bisulfite Sequencing; ChIP-Seq = Chromatin Immunoprecipitation 
Sequencing.  
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 See, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/ Precision Medicine; see also https://www.nih.gov/research-training/allofus-research-
program (Accessed 30 April 2017). 
10
 See, Nabipour and Assadi (2016); see also Zhang (2015).  
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The “further understanding of cancer” is under the heading of “integration and interpretation”. 
How exactly is integration to be interpreted here? What do we want to integrate, and how? The 
philosophical literature usually presents integration in the positive. Plutynski (2013), for 
instance, stresses how integration has become endowed with normative weight, carrying with it 
the underlying idea that the more integrative the scientific enterprise is, the better, the more 
holistic and closer to completeness the picture provided is. But what are the partial pictures to be 
integrated as in the scenario of current cancer research? What strategies adopted in that context 
are deemed “integrative”? Integration has also to do with the wider picture we have of the target 
phenomenon, depends on it and, in turn, affects it. Whether we believe integration should, in the 
end, prove how all different portions of knowledge conspire to create a single account of the 
phenomenon under investigation or whether, while interacting, they should remain alternative 
are sensitive issues which are likely to affect the philosophy of cancer as a complex disease also 
in the long run. They impact on our evaluation of the successfulness of forms of integration and 
on the uses we put them to. What follows addresses these problems in the light of a novel 
approach to cancer research, showing how it actually conceives of integration in an attempt to 
tame cancer complexity, stressing its possible epistemological consequences. 
Fig.1 represents the not-yet fully realized integrative programme of comprehensive 
information flow starting from the patient's genome, transcriptome and epigenome to the clinical 
decision. It is a flow made possible by the data evaluation pathway with bioinformatics 
algorithms applied to genomics, transcriptomics and epigenomics sequencing technologies, 
which permit an analysis of the detected genomic mutations, genetic variants, differential gene 
expression, fusion transcripts, DNA methylations, transcription binding factors, etc. The figure 
also pictures the integration of protein expression information into appropriate genes and 
metabolic/functional networks, which ultimately facilitates mapping the framework for a 
personalized treatment strategy. Interestingly, the last column on the right hand side of the 
figure is headed “Integration and Interpretation”, with “Function effect of mutation”, “Network 
and pathway analysis” and “Integrative analysis” being called to converge into a larger, 
conceptually very wide, box indicating that “Further understanding of cancer and clinical 
applications” are to be reached. The steps through which knowledge shall shift from the 
penultimate to the ultimate column on the right hand side of the figure, thus obtaining an 
integration and proper interpretation for better understanding, are a core epistemological 
concern, worthy of deeper investigation.  
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Parallel to the massive advances of the biotechnologies in the field of ‘omics’ sequencing, 
imaging biotechnologies have also made impressive steps forward. If the discovery of x-rays 
more than a century ago profoundly changed the practice of medicine by enabling us to see 
inside the living body, molecular imaging is now probing deep inside the body to reveal its inner 
workings. And this is the other side of precision medicine. Unlike conventional imaging studies, 
which produce primarily structural pictures, molecular imaging visualizes how the body is 
functioning and what is occurring at the cellular and molecular levels. This has opened the door 
to a better understanding of the pathways of disease, the design of new drugs, improved 
therapeutic decision-making, and monitoring the patient’s response to treatment. Molecular 
imaging allows non-invasive assessment, and quantification is especially desirable when 
following patients over time. Of course, to assess cellular function noninvasively, it is important 
to identify biomarkers that are specific to a disease or cellular process that we wish to 
measure11. Here again the question of integration springs up, no longer limited to integrating the 
“omics” results alone, or with the clinical information, but “omics” results and molecular 
imaging results, as shown in Fig. 2, to obtain the best diagnosis and therapy.  
Here, we have two levels of complexity. On the one hand, there is a sort of ontological 
complexity related to features of a healthy or diseased human body. It is a complexity related to 
what we are discovering day by day, thanks to the increasingly powerful biotechnologies. Now 
we are beginning to understand the amazing number of molecules at play belonging to different 
“omic” levels and their mutual deterministic and, more often, probabilistic causal interactions, 
characterised by non-linearity, sensitivity to the initial conditions, sensitivity to the cellular and 
extracellular environmental conditions, sensitivity to temporal (i.e., developmental and 
evolutionary) and spatial (i.e., location in the body, in the organ, in the tissue) parameters, etc. 
On the other hand, there is data complexity, emerging from the application of sequencing and 
imaging biotechnologies. Now we have an increasingly large volume of data, concerning not 
only a single individual but sometimes thousands of individuals (see, e.g., Strasser, 2017; 
Leonelli, 2016). Such data have to be interpreted, integrated and thus governed, especially for 
clinical reasons and especially in the oncological field, in a unitary framework, which should be 
explanatory if possible, but especially predictive and not only classificatory. We should not 
forget that, from the specific point of view of the patient struggling against the disease, having 
several models describing his/her complex abnormal phenomenon is unlikely to be appreciated 
as beneficial in direct clinical terms. While pluralism can be very fruitful in theoretical terms, a 
physician, and even more so a patient, can actually feel disoriented by an array of models, and 
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 See e.g. Xue et al. (2013) and Pu et al. (2016a) and (2016b).  
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related alternative therapeutic choices and prognostic frameworks. What is important for the 
patient is to have something which reduces the range of alternative scenarios she is presented 
with, and which could quickly suggest the most effective therapy, given current medical 
knowledge, and a plausible prognosis. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 (From Ghasemi et al., 2016).  
 
3.2 Tumour heterogeneity 
The drive towards the molecular analysis of oncological diseases, with the impressive advances 
of biotechnologies and CIT, has not only given rise to the precision medicine approach, but also 
made problematic aspects emerge more clearly. On the one hand, it has opened the door to 
enthusiastic expectations on the possibilities of curing severe pathologies, and on the other, to a 
deeper awareness of the difficulties in pursuing that goal. In particular, we have become aware 
of what is known as tumour heterogeneity. Tumour heterogeneity means not only that each 
cancer has to be individualised in a specific patient, but, more importantly, that each cancer 
affecting a given individual is actually composed of a set of different cancer subpopulations. 
That is, cells belonging to the same cancer show distinct genetic and phenotypic characteristics 
(such as gene expression, metabolism, motility, and angiogenic, proliferative, immunogenic, and 
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metastatic potential) in different space locations and in different time frames. This impressive 
complexity lies at the centre of an intensive biomedical research programme,12 and is posing a 
huge challenge to medicine, and to precision medicine in particular. We have hence understood 
that any patient’s cancer is a particular, specific disease, and that “many cancers” coexist in the 
same patient’s cancer, each with its own histopathological and biological features.  
Tumour heterogeneity is multifaceted, comprising: 1) intertumour heterogeneity, i.e., 
variability between tumours arising in the same organ, and intratumour heterogeneity, i.e. 
variability in the same individual tumour (see Burrell, 2013); 2) spatial heterogeneity, indicating 
that different regions of a tumour present different series of genetic aberrations, and temporal 
heterogeneity, referring to the course of disease progression (see Geyer et al., 2010; Torres et al., 
2006; Martelotto et al., 2014). Heterogeneity within primary tumours is only one aspect. Cancer 
could also be thought of as a systemic disease13: over time, malignant cancers shed a large 
number of cells into the bloodstream and lymph vessels; some of these cells find a place in 
distant sites and develop into metastases. Therefore, to have a proper understanding of cancer 
heterogeneity we should also understand metastatic tumours, which, as is known, are the most 
fearsome, since they are responsible for the majority of cancer-related deaths.  
Tumour heterogeneity means tumour complexity, and several different models have been 
proposed to address it, including mathematical models. What is interesting is that more or less 
any model which tries to cope with such complexity has borrowed its jargon from a range of 
different biological fields: evolutionary biology, developmental biology, population genetics, 
ecology, stem cell biology, etc. Unfortunately, none of these models is capable by itself of 
grasping the heterogeneity (complexity), but only certain aspects of the phenomena at stake (see 
Boniolo, 2017). Summing up, we are in a typical epistemic situation regarding complexity as 
tackled by the philosophers, as recalled in §2. However, patients cannot but be most interested 
in efficacy of treatments, rather than in ontological and/ or epistemic complexity.  
In epistemological terms, tumour heterogeneity can be understood in a range of different 
ways. On the one hand, this raises issues to do with the need to design general models of 
pathologies, and on the other, with how single cases can be accounted for in clinics. Therefore, 
attempts to tame complexity in this context cannot neglect their practical, clinical implications. 
Again, we need a unitary framework that a tumour (a diseased patient) can be assigned to, after 
some choice on which specific features to ignore or diminish. Concerns related to heterogeneity 
and single cases are thus related also to the last aspect we shall touch upon to give a proper 
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 See the recent issue of Nature (VV. AA., 2013, issue 501) devoted to it. 
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 Note that there many different ways of thinking cancer that have been proposed along the years. No one is 
unanimously accepted by researchers and clinicians. For philosophical overviews of the different positions, see 
Bertolaso (2016) and Plutynski (forthcoming, 2018). 
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sense to the philosophical aspects stemming from state-of-the-art cancer research.   
 
3.3 Biomarkers and stratifications 
Biomarkers have played a crucial role with respect to the impact of new sequencing and 
imaging biotechnologies and the acknowledgment of tumour heterogeneity. In cancer, DNA-
based biomarkers (SNPs, chromosomal aberrations, changes in DNA copy number, 
microsatellite instability, differential promoter-region methylation, etc.), RNA-based biomarkers 
(over or under-expressed transcripts, microRNAs, etc.) and protein biomarkers (cell-surface 
receptors, tumour antigens, phosphorylation states, tumour-released peptides into body fluids, 
etc.) are particularly important14. 
Precision medicine considers biomarkers crucial indicators when trying to answer questions 
such as: Who has or could have a disease? What is the actual or potential disease? Who could or 
should be treated, and with what? How could the patient react to the treatment? Biomarkers are 
taken as a fundamental key to most clinical matters – matters which are strongly affected by 
each patient’s peculiar individual features and, at the same time, by the struggle to classify 
tumours. Speaking of biomarkers means speaking of stratifications among individuals on the 
basis of being or not being the carrier of one or more of them.  
Classification practices in medicine have been changing over time. Patients have been 
classified on the basis of symptoms, or signs, or other characteristics. With the advent of 
molecular biology, classifications have gone deeper, to the molecular level. This means 
producing more precise stratifications of potential and actual patients, but also vastly enlarging 
their numbers by iteratively creating new ones. In a sense, delving into the molecular level 
potentially brings with it a fragmentation of possible classifications, and forces us to reflect on 
which molecular data we should actually focus to avoid too broad a proliferation. This worry 
has to do with the fact that a deluge of molecular data is produced daily by laboratories, and new 
problems arise as to how to manage them, in particular how to give them clinical significance 
and how to clinically validate them for preventive, predictive, diagnostic, prognostic and 
therapeutic purposes. Alongside enthusiasm for the availability of huge amounts of molecular 
data, we are called to ask whether they are equally significant, and easily manageable, for all the 
epistemic and clinical purposes just listed. Concerning validation, there is sort of ‘contrapasso’: 
the growing number of possible cancer biomarkers studied in the laboratory is associated with a 
shrinking number of them being clinically validated, either due to the cost of clinical validation, 
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 See, for example, Lee (2003); Bracht (2009); Koychev et al. (2011); Negm, Verma and Srivastava (2002); Vasan 
(2006). 
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or to the time required for the same15. 
To address these points in more detail, let us consider breast cancer classification. The 
current routine for breast cancer assessment usually comprises a clinical component, involving 
information gathered by imaging techniques, clinical examinations and biographic narrations, 
and a morpho-histopathological component, where an analysis is made of the tumour size, grade 
and lymph node status and the tests regarding the oestrogen receptor (ER), progesterone 
receptor (PR) and human epidermal growth factor receptor 2 (HER2).16 Pathologists are then 
used to classifying breast cancer into four main subtypes: luminal A (usually ER+ and/or PR+, 
HER2-, with a low proliferation index); luminal B (ER+ and/or PR+ and high proliferation 
index); HER2-amplified (ER-, PR- and high levels of HER2); and basal-like cancer (the ‘triple 
negative’, i.e. negative with ER-, PR- and HER2-). However, it is now widely recognised that 
this grouping does not reliably predict how tumours will behave. One possible way out rests on 
inserting molecular profiling and adding molecular classification. But then we are required to 
decide which molecular classification we should rely on, and how information from the usual 
path and information from the molecular level are to be brought together. Shifting to the 
molecular level, in other words, does not per se warrant a single clear-cut classification suitable 
for clinical purposes. 
Summing up, we do not have a single stratification accepted by the entire biomedical 
community, but several stratifications depending both on the set of biomarkers selected and 
identified and on their purpose. That is, we have a number of different classifications of 
diseased patients, each of which is grounded on bottoming out underlying features, but also 
depends on a priori decisions on which biomarkers (or set of biomarkers) are to be considered. 
Epistemological concerns thus clearly raise questions as to the grounds on which a biomarker 
(or set of biomarkers) is chosen as the most relevant, and how the purpose for which some 
biomarkers are identified influences such choice. The proliferation of stratifications is 
troublesome in a number of respects: at the preclinical level, since we have to fully understand 
their clinical significance and adoptability; at the clinical level, since we have to manage all of 
them in order to propose a diagnosis and a therapy; at a philosophical level too, since we are 
faced with different bio-ontologies, each connected with a different patient stratification and, 
thus, with a different research enterprise and focus on clinical level. How data belonging to 
different bio-ontologies can be integrated and which relations can be drawn between different 
stratifications and classificatory strategies are puzzling aspects. 
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 See, e.g., Goossens et al. (2015); Mordente et al. (2015); Scatena (2015). 
16 The receptor status is identified by immunohistochemistry, which stains the cells based on the presence (ER+, 
PR+, HER2+) or the absence (ER-, PR-, HER2-) of the receptor itself.   
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From a philosophical perspective, such a situation encourages discussion of which 
conclusions we should draw from the availability of several stratifications, and what should 
drive our choices in terms of taxonomies to be adopted. More in general, we should reflect over 
which relations hold between ongoing progress in methodologies to investigate diseases and the 
construction of nosographies – which tend to undergo iterative processes. Classifications are 
based on empirical detections, but they rely heavily on the methods of investigation and, 
therefore, on the technological innovations permitting them. Given the ways in which research 
is progressing, the deeper investigative methods allow us to go, the more stratifications we have. 
Validating these stratifications both from a research and a clinical standpoint is then problematic, 
as is establishing how “to make them talk to each other”, since they deal with different levels 
(organs, tissues, cells, molecules) and can be constructed for different uses (biomedical basic 
and translational research, clinical practice) and epistemic and practical purposes (prevention, 
explanation, prediction, diagnosis, prognosis, therapy).  
All the questions we have been posing in outlining various aspects of current cancer research 
are closely interrelated. The ways in which we describe cancer as a pathological condition – or, 
rather, as an array of possible pathological conditions – rely on the different kinds of evidence 
collected, the different technological resources allowing us to collect them, and on our capacity 
to integrate different portions of the information acquired. Different descriptions in turn affect 
classification practices, which impact on diagnoses and hence treatments, as well as tentative 
explanatory accounts. Explanations, again, affect the ways in which we describe and classify, 
how we decide which features are to be taken as relevant for the inception, progress and course 
of the disease we are considering, and how we shall, in the end, carve tumours out of the huge, 
impressive amount of available data. Descriptions, stratification and classification processes, 
explanatory and integrative strategies have been revolutionized by novel technologies devised to 
deal with impressive amounts of data.17 The quest for integration put forward in research 
contexts has to do with the availability of different sets of data produced in different research, 
translational, or clinical contexts, with bio-ontologies, different methods and tools. A demand to 
integrate forms of diversity arises in research settings and is taken as the preliminary and 
necessary step to be taken if we want to take proper advantage of the results produced in one 
field and transpose them to another. What follows dwells on a specific methodology in cancer 
studies and analyses its import for theoretical approaches to cancer complexity, and for our very 
conception of how taxonomies of complex diseases can be built and the uses they can be put to.           
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 For some critical remarks over the use of big data, and on limits and drawback of big data science, see, e.g. Boyd 
and Crawford (2012); Leonelli (2014); Kitchin (2014); Coveney, Dougherty and Highfield (2016)  
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4. Complexity and integrative clustering 
As shown, the advent of new sequencing and imaging biotechnologies has allowed deeper 
investigation at molecular level yielding what has been called precision medicine, but it has also 
opened the Pandora’s box of cancer heterogeneity, enormous quantities of data, and many 
different ways of stratifying actual and potential cancers and patients. In short, we have 
complexity and search for integration at different levels. How should we tame it, or try to tame 
it? It seems that the password is integration by means of CIT tools.  
Many different attempts to integrate data and methods have been advanced and papers on 
promising integrative approaches for precision medicine are published by leading scientific 
journals almost weekly. We focus here on iCluster (or integrativeCluster), an integrative 
approach which, although by no means the only option currently available18, is extremely 
interesting also from a philosophical standpoint, insofar as it stimulates a range of conceptual 
considerations.  
On the one hand, there is no single objective way to evaluate cluster analysis methods, since 
they depend on the problem-specific information, epistemic purposes and research programmes 
scientists are interested in. On the other hand, we should not conceive of cluster analysis as 
somehow arbitrary (Hennig 2015). According to one of the most popular textbooks on statistics, 
“cluster analysis, also called data segmentation, has a variety of goals. All relate to grouping or 
segmenting a collection of objects into subsets or ‘clusters’, such that those within each cluster 
are more closely related to one another than objects assigned to different clusters. An object can 
be described by a set of measurements, or by its relation to other objects. In addition, the goal is 
sometimes to arrange the clusters into a natural hierarchy. […] Central to all of the goals of 
cluster analysis is the notion of the degree of similarity (or dissimilarity) between the individual 
objects being clustered. A clustering method attempts to group the objects based on the 
definition of similarity supplied to it” (Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman 2008, p. 501). This 
procedure raises the well-known problem of how to classify or categorize the elements under 
investigation, and how to order the classification or categorisation obtained, given some choice 
on the respects and degrees of similarity/dissimilarity. This problem, already encountered above 
touching on the issue of patient stratification, has been addressed throughout the history of 
philosophy (Boniolo 2007, Ch. 1). We do not want here to address the metaphysical and 
ontological vexata quaestio of possible natural kinds in the life sciences or that of universals. 
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 A particularly interesting and successful approach proposal on tumour heterogeneity – specifically, in breast 
cancer - and modes of providing distinctive molecular portraits of each tumour is provided by Perou and Sorlie (see 
e.g. Perou, Sorlie et al 2000). As we discuss in the following, what characterizes iCluster with respect to this 
classification and similar ones is that while these latter are based on molecular features, the former is characterized 
by both molecular and clinical features.  
 18
Our purpose, rather, is to shed light on the ways in which the innovative methodologies leading 
to different ways of defining diseases, and carving them out of incredibly large amounts of data 
as working entities, de facto deeply question our classification practices. As we have seen when 
presenting strata realised via biomarkers, the epistemologically relevant point is that we choose 
which biomarkers to consider and then build the strata bottom-up, relying on our choices. 
Depending on the biomarker (or set of biomarkers) chosen, be it at genomic or proteomic, etc., 
level, we can have different classifications. The same applies to the computational cluster: we 
choose the similarities/dissimilarities on whose basis the clusters and their hierarchies have to be 
generated. Then, how they are generated and which hierarchies of clusters we obtain depend on 
the algorithm we decide to run over the data19. Our epistemic procedures, and evaluations of 
what counts as most relevant, play a fundamental role. Moreover, this all hints towards a general 
failure of a reductionist approach based on the focus on a particular mutated gene or protein, or 
on a particular molecular mechanism20. Summing up, algorithms running over huge amounts of 
data have taken the place of attempts to unravel networks of underlying mechanisms.   
With respect to breast cancer, the idea underlying iCluster is to try to integrate databases at 
genomic and transcriptomic levels by means of computational statistics, namely cluster analysis. 
C. Caldas and his group21 began analysing about 1,000 samples from breast cancer patients 
considered homogeneous for treatment purposes and which referred to a follow-up study of 
about 10 years, hence also having a lot of clinical information on what happened to the patients 
later on in time22. They made a genomic inquiry focused on hereditary characteristics, such as 
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) and copy number variation (CNV), and on somatic 
characteristics (copy number alterations, CNA), and a transcriptomic inquiry on how hereditary 
characteristics could alter gene expression both at the same locus (cis action) and at different 
loci (trans action).23 In order to understand the differences between normal and pathological 
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 Of course, this is not the right place to enter technical details on the statistical algorithms that are used. They 
could be easily retrieved in textbooks on cluster theory, or in the scientific papers adopting statistical models based 
on it. Our current focus is on the epistemological impact of the adoption of iCluster in dealing with cancer 
complexity, especially from a classificatory and a prognostic standpoint.  
20
 Against the reductionism concerning molecular mechanisms and in favour of a more holist approach based on 
pathways, see Boniolo, Campaner (2018). 
21
 https://www.cruk.cam.ac.uk/research-groups/caldas-group. See Curtis et al. (2012); Ali et al. (2014); Bruna et al. 
(2016); Pereira et al. (2016); Russnes et al. (2017).   
22
 The group obtained about 1,000 frozen breast cancer samples from five tumor biobanks in the UK and Canada. It 
should be noted that “Nearly all oestrogen receptor (ER)-positive and/or lymph node (LN)-negative patients did not 
receive chemotherapy, whereas ER-negative and LN-positive patients did. Additionally, none of the HER21patients 
received trastuzumab. As such, the treatments were homogeneous with respect to clinically relevant groupings.” 
(Curtis et al. 2012, p. 346). 
23 The SNPs are the most common type of genetic variation among people. Each SNP represents a difference in a 
single DNA nucleotide. CNV is a repetition of sections of the genome the number of repetition varies among 
people. CNA is a repetition of sections of the genome that has arisen in somatic tissue. Cis module and trasn 
module are stretches of DNA that affect the expression, respectively, of nearby and distant genes 
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conditions, they took blood samples from 500 healthy patients to identify when a copy number 
was not oncologically pathological. Then they used computer algorithms to search for clusters, 
based on similarities in CNV, SNP, CNA and gene expression correlated with clinical 
information.  At the end of the computation process, they obtained ten different clusters they 
called Integrative Clusters (iClusters, or IntClusters).       
The problem, at this point, was to validate the ten iClusters, to compare them with other 
molecular classifications and, most importantly, to understand their clinical validity. The 
scientists involved succeeded in this task by using a second cohort of about 1,000 breast cancer 
samples and a third cohort of about 7,500 samples. As shown in the table (Fig. 3), they 
successfully managed to compare their clusterisations both with other molecular 
characterisations (e.g., PAM5024) and with the clinical outcomes25. With respect to clinical 
matters, they also showed that their integrative classification reflected differences in 
chemotherapy. This might be seen as a good example of how to link molecular classification to 
clinical treatment, and to treatment outcomes. And it is this union, rather this integration, of 
molecular information and clinical information that characterises the iCluster approach and 
renders it different from the many other classifications which rely only on a molecular or on a 
clinical basis. In order to reach such a result, however, the researchers used a collection of breast 
cancer studies on patients who received chemotherapy adjuvants and from whom data were 
available concerning the so-called pathological Complete Response (pCR).26 The iCluster 
approach also provides a grouping of biomarkers that can be used to test new treatments, with 
the underlying idea that by means of such testing of treatments we do not just perform trials to 
establish drug efficacy, but also, in a sense, test the adequacy of disease classification for 
clinical purposes. If we take this seriously, the very idea of how a complex disease is identified 
undergoes a significant change, with the responses to treatments impacting back on the 
definition of the pathology for which they were prescribed and which they were meant to cure. 
To some extent, classification of the disease is driven not only by the search for its underlying 
conditions or – more or less remote – aetiological causes, but a look backwards is accompanied 
also by a look forward in time towards clinical outcomes and the efficacy of drugs and 
prognoses. 
                                                             
24 PAM50 (Prosigna®) is a tumour profiling test that helps determine the benefit of using chemotherapy in addition 
to hormone therapy for some oestrogen receptor-positive (ER-positive) and HER2-negative breast cancers. 
25
 An analogous figure, but contemplating also a column explicitly dedicated to prognosis, is Table II in Dawson et 
al. (2013). 
26 A tumour is said to have had a pathological Complete Response (i.e. a pCR) if, after surgery, no residual cancer 
cells remain. 
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Fig. 3 (From Russnes et al. (2017). 
 
This approach is very promising, as evidenced by the works adopting it (mutatis mutandis) to 
classify other types of cancer, in particular prostate cancer (five clusters), pancreatic cancer 
(four clusters), colorectal cancer (four clusters), bladder cancer (five clusters) and melanoma 
(four clusters).27  
And what can be done for cancer heterogeneity? Nik-Zainal and colleagues faced this 
challenge by adopting a similar approach trying to find a unitary framework of such complexity 
exactly through computational integration28. They started from the idea, borrowed from 
population genetics (see Boniolo 2017), that there is a sort of “most common ancestor”, that is, 
they suggested dividing the somatic mutations occurring over cancer’s lifetime into those 
acquired before the last selective selection, and therefore shared by all cancer cells, and those 
acquired afterwards. They analysed the genome of 21 breast cancer samples to reconstruct their 
genomic history, clustering the classes of mutations via computation algorithms. To support 
their conception of what cancer heterogeneity means in terms of complexity, they built a 
clustered catalogue of more than 200,000 different mutations occurring over the course of 
patients’ lives.  
Thus, at least for breast cancer, we have the integration proposed by Caldas and colleagues, 
focused on taming tumour complexity at genomic and transcriptomic level but also considering 
                                                             
27 See, respectively, Ross-Adams (2015); Weddell et al. (2015); Guinney et al. (2015); Robertson et al. (2017); 
Cancer Genome Atlas Network (2015). 
28
 Mutational processes molding the genomes of 21 breast cancers. See Nik-Zainal et al. (2012); Nik-Zainal et al. 
(2016); Morganella et al. (2016).  
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the clinical level, and the integration proposed by Nik-Zainal and colleagues, focused on taming 
tame cancer heterogeneity. Although the two approaches could have a sort of meta-integration29, 
let us stay on Caldas’ project and elaborate further on its epistemological significance and 
prospects.  
 
5. Taming complexity through integration: philosophical explorations on cancer research 
The sections above have presented a few aspects related to current cancer research having to do 
with complexity and integration, understood in a manifold way. Issues arise due to new 
sequencing and imaging technologies, the awareness of cancer heterogeneity, different kinds of 
methodologies employed and evidence collected, and different possible classifications. 
Considering cancer heterogeneity, we have seen that each tumour is different from all others and 
is actually composed of different sub-tumours. Complexity in biomedicine strongly and directly 
impacts on clinical matters. It is totally unrealistic to start from complex features of cancers to 
try to find a therapy or propose a prognosis to a specific patient. In order to try to restore the 
previous, non-pathological course of events in each single patient, we must intervene in such 
variety, and to do so we need to start from some grouping of cancers. But on which bases? Some 
form of grouping must be devised to allow a partition in reference classes where any kind of 
tumour (and thus any patient) can be located, even if not in an absolutely precise way, in the 
best possible way given current knowledge. In other terms, to address both research and, even 
more so, clinical matters, “similarities must be found out of dissimilarities” among patients due 
to the uniqueness of their disease, their clinical story and their “omics”, and these similarities 
should allow classificatory practices to impact effectively on explanatory and predictive issues 
relevant for each single patient.  
In a wider theoretical perspective, everything we have sketchily addressed in the sections 
above hints at the fact that tumours and the related available data challenge our conception of 
diseases, and in many senses force us to reshape our epistemic practice when looking for 
explanatory, predictive and prognostic accounts. To recall the examples analysed above, we can 
no longer speak in terms of, for instance, breast cancer, but, properly speaking, we should refer 
to one of the many possible cancers affecting the breast. If so, how do we cope with several 
different diseases of the same kind, both in theoretical and clinical terms? Should we change 
nosology, and, if so, on which grounds should we do so, given that we can have several different 
classifications of possible cancers affecting the breast? How do current classificatory practices 
impact on our understanding of cancer as a complex disease and of its natural history, and how 
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 This is what is happening inside the Personalised Breast Cancer Project!  See, 
https://crukcambridgecentre.org.uk/news/personalised-breast-cancer-program-launches-cambridge. 
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do our classifications, given the deluge of available data, allow for the attribution of each single 
case to the proper reference class? 
We have seen that in the case of integrative clusters, a combination of “information on the 
genomic and transcriptomic landscapes of […] cancer to refine the molecular classification of 
the disease” (Dawson et al. 2013, p. 617) is pursued through statistical and computational 
methods. A revision of the disease classification is suggested, rather than its reduction to some 
allegedly more fundamental level. Approaches to complexity and, especially, to integration must 
be rethought and reshaped. iClusters do not address complexity by epistemic decomposition of 
the system into subsystems and then re-assembly, or by the integration of compatible and 
complementary explanatory models. What is integrated is not different accounts of the same 
behaviour, but rather heterogeneous data through clustering procedures based on similarities. 
What tables like the one in Fig.3 above represent is a form of integration, which is aimed to 
supply information on the inception of each sub-type of the disease (and, in this sense, to supply 
causal explanatory information at the level of chromosome mutations), a predictive account of 
the disease (with respect to biomarkers), and a prognostic picture (see the last column on the 
right).  This yields a unitary framework allowing a new classification that takes into account 
both the bench level (i.e., the research one based on “omics”) and the bedside level (i.e., the 
clinical one based on patients’ situation and follow up), and also serves as a predictive tool. 
With data integration, what in the end is being suggested is also integration of different 
epistemic procedures. 
Discussing complex systems, Wimsatt has stressed that we need to decide which are the 
relevant components and levels with respect to the epistemic aim at stake, plus “we need to 
know more generally how we order and relate different descriptions of the behaviour of a 
system, particularly partial descriptions, to construct explanatory accounts of its behaviour” 
(2007, p. 161). Wimsatt’s view both does and does not fit the case at stake here. On the one 
hand, decisions on what counts as relevant variables and on the epistemic aims to be pursued 
play a crucial role in clustering: clustering per se is not a domain-independent method, it is used 
in a variety of contexts and with different goals, and it is then with respect to specific goals and 
contexts that merits of clusters will be evaluated30. On the other hand, not much seems to be left 
in integrative clustering of the direct construction of different partial, explicit descriptions, to be 
then combined to form explanatory accounts of the behaviour of the system itself. The focus is 
not on discourses on the integration of different explanatory levels in the medical context, or on 
epistemological concerns regarding interactions among levels at various spatio-temporal scales, 
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 On measures and evaluation of the usefulness of clusters for particular tasks, and for a catalogue of clustering 
problems, see e.g. von Luxburg, Williamson and Guyon (2012). 
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or the disclosure of different mechanistic sub-systems. Hierarchies and levels are set aside in 
favour of a range of integrative, therapeutically relevant and predictive clusters, each being 
“associated with distinct clinical outcomes and providing new insights into the underlying 
biology and potential molecular drivers” (Dawson et al. 2013, p. 617). Clues on the biological 
underpinnings are not achieved through the interaction of multiple alternative accounts. Rather, 
the identification of diseases, and some fixing of cancer type and subtypes, stem from the 
clusters themselves on the basis of the algorithms chosen. 
What is worth stressing is that a totally different, novel idea of “integration” is at stake here, 
an idea that is not taken as part and parcel of forms of pluralism. Different kinds of data are 
collected from different, heterogeneous sources and include genomic, epigenomic, 
transcriptomic, clinical, epidemiological, etc., information. No direct cooperation between 
different research groups and laboratories is advocated, and sharing of data and collaboration 
across fields takes a very specific form: integration is achieved by clustering thanks to statistics 
and computer algorithms. In this perspective, the pathology is not identified on the basis of, for 
instance, symptoms and signs alone, nor on the basis of a given set of biomarkers fixed ex ante, 
to then progressively add further variables and complementary perspectives. Cancer 
classification is presented as the outcome of the computational clustering process, which serves 
as a bridge-tool to navigate our way through the deluge of biological data and follow-up clinical 
data, and, at the same time, to pursue both explanatory and predictive targets – through focus on 
etiological and prognostic factors respectively. Cancer types and subtypes are thus carved out of 
complexity by computational tools; integration is achieved by establishing patterns, which will 
then be taken as reference points to overcome problems and secure better diagnosis and 
treatment. The classifications mentioned above based on clustering take all or most of the course 
of patients’ lives into account, considering both mutations and treatment outcomes. 
Classification itself is grounded on data collected at different spatial and temporal scales, which 
are reassembled through clustering. Temporal scales, in particular, span long intervals: not only 
is it assumed that, given the complex features of cancer, the development of the disorder and its 
dynamics must be followed from the predisposing factors up to the symptoms, but that 
prognostic elements will also influence classification. Integration here is then not seen as a 
solution aimed at making different stances converge, in the end, or different models interact 
fruitfully, possibly as complementary pictures. Rather, integration of data and interpretation of 
their epistemological significance in outlining aspects of the natural history of the disease go 
hand in hand and proceed simultaneously.  
“Integration” has been widely discussed as providing some sort of forward thinking, which, 
 24
as we stressed in § 2, has been presented as highly beneficial with respect to various epistemic 
aims. What are the steps forward warranted by iClusters? As appears from the above reflections, 
the forward-looking aspect here is not dictated by some puzzle-like arrangement of partial 
complementary accounts, but by devising computational tools that address not only, e.g., genetic 
diversity due to inherited genetic variation or acquired genomic aberrations, but also variances 
in incidence, in treatment efficacy, and in intermediate prognoses and survival rates, that is, 
clinical aspects. The importance of proper sub-stratification is highlighted as the road to novel 
potential therapeutic targets31. What is ultimately taken as relevant for the identification of what 
cancer is are both occurrences back in the patient’s life and elements which are significant in 
terms of treatments and their outcomes. Complexity is addressed by isolating classificatory sets, 
and concerns shall then regard aspects of cluster validity and their measurements – considering, 
e.g., such issues as small within-cluster dissimilarities or between-cluster separation32. At the 
same time, the distance between prognosis and classification grows shorter, with the 
classification being quite far away from attempts at some definitive nosography. 
What these new methodologies suggest are shifts in epistemic attitudes as well: instead of 
digging deeper and deeper, discussing aggregative/non-aggregative, emergent/reducible, 
decomposable, non-decomposable or nearly-decomposable features, to unravel underlying 
mechanisms and the like, the relevance of a look at the life-long development of conditions and 
at the outcomes of treatment strategies is stressed. Also symptoms at later disease stages are 
called to play a larger role in our epistemic practices, while aetiological factors are called to 
initiate an explanatory discourse.  
Summing up, even if it cannot be considered the solution and even less the definitive solution, 
iCluster integration can be taken as a relevant, original and up-to-date standpoint to question 
more traditional – medical and philosophical – ways to address issues in biomedical research, 
from problems concerning interactions between different disciplinary fields to the philosophical 
implications of different ways of grouping entities. Integrative clustering puts forward a 
different way of coping with integrative needs, and encourages us to reconsider which relations 
can be established between describing, classifying and explaining a complex disorder once we 
opt for the identification of patterns through algorithms. Philosophical reflections will then have 
to reconsider theoretical approaches to integration, and address the genuine epistemological 
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 For instance, in discussing IntCluster3, Dawson et al (2013) state: “The excellent prognosis of this subtype 
emphasizes the importance of identifying this cluster within the previously defined luminal A intrinsic subtype, as 
these individuals represent a distinct group that could potentially be spared treatment with systemic chemotherapy” 
(p. 622), while InCluster4 provides hints as to specific immunological responses, to be exploited for future 
therapies. 
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 See e.g. Hennig (2017). 
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meaning of classificatory practices in taming complexity33. In turn, iClusters opens up a range of 
further questions: How stable is the taxonomy we are provided with, and under which 
circumstances will it be revised? Which definitions and descriptions of cancer could we build up 
relying on the integrative clusters elaborated, and how fine-grained shall they be? How much 
does integrative clustering, as an antidote to excessive disciplinary specialization and 
fragmentation of data patterns, illuminate biological complexity as such? How does this all 
impact the delivery of healthcare to individuals? And to what extent do cluster-based 
approaches to identifying dependencies actually draw on existing theories?  
In order to answer to these epistemological question, one should carefully consider two 
aspects: i) every clustering method depends on the quality and the extent of the available data 
and that since the interactome (i.e., the complete available set of interacting molecules in a 
human organism) has yet to be completed, the clusters identified by the same iCluster method 
could evolve in time and with the ever increasing amount of molecular data available; ii) 
different types of clustering methods would have led to potentially different results, different 
subgroups and to reclassifying some patients.  
All these issues are affected by the fact that, in the cases we are considering, we do not move 
from the identification of some given entity to the integration of kinds of evidence and/or 
models over it, we are not clustering around a mechanism or the like. Instead, the entity itself is 
identified through a computational integration of heterogeneous data. Whereas the traditional 
cancer nomenclature has been based on organ location, thereby directly designating the affected 
structure, the unprecedented amount of data collected from increasingly large tumour cohorts 
has challenged such grounding. What are integrated now are huge sets of data into robust 
classifiers, to be clinically implemented in patient management. Amongst critical issues we find 
the need to avoid excessive fracturing of cancer subtypes, and the identification of their precise 
biological meaning34. Clusters should be used for prediction and risk stratification as moves 
towards precision medicine. One of the next steps to be taken will be to evaluate “within-cluster 
patient heterogeneity, which would be studied by relating patients’ distance to the cluster centre 
or posterior probabilities of cluster membership to outcomes” (van Smeden, Harrell and Dahly 
2018, p. 440), and to discuss criteria upon which some variables are relevant for clustering and 
some are not. “In real applications, in which the variables have a meaning that is of substantial 
importance for the clustering task, choosing different variables changes the meaning of the 
resulting clustering, [...] and whether certain variables ‘do not cluster’ and whether they then 
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 For some theoretical reflections on the relations between clusters and ways of conceiving natural kinds, reality 
and truth, see Hennig (2015). Hennig discusses context- and aims-dependence of clustering methods, comparisons 
and choices among them, and related impacts in practice.  
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 On problems for cancer classification see also Song at al. (2015). 
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should not be involved in the computation of the clustering of interest depends on the context 
and the clustering aims” (Hennig 2015, p. 61).  
In sum, iCluster is not the solution to tackle cancer complexity, but it seems to be a fruitful 
approach, which, by bringing together molecular and clinical information, effectively provides 
etiological and prognostic classes of relevance, where any new patient could be inserted and 
hence have a robust idea of what his/her clinical trajectory is likely to be. Moreover, not only 
does iCluster play a promising role in classificatory practice, but it is also a reliable starting 
point, given currently available knowledge, for individualised treatments. 
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